

Experience of the Organization of the Front-Rear Provision and Moral and Spiritual Provision of Federal Troops of the Russian Federation in Combat Actions

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Abstract

In this article, the experiments of the federal troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the organization of the front-rear supply and moral-mental supply in combat actions in the North Caucasus region, shortcomings in the organization of the front-rear supply and moral-mental supply in combat actions and the analysis of organization and conduct, conclusions are discussed.

Keywords: Federal troops, troops supply, food supply, fuel consumption standard, practical experience, moral-mental supply, moral-mental state.

INTRODUCTION

In modern armed majors, the foreign state armed forces' inig experiences of organizing material supply in the study of which countries are ahead of us in a deeper study of the experience and the conclusions drawn during the study can influence our Armed Forces to increase their combat potential, their views, the mechanics of the functioning of their material supply system it is important We will also study the experience of which countries in solving this issue, which is the experience of the state in the strategic region, NATO States, Europe, East or west countries?

Of course, in solving this issue, we must first consider the organizational state structure of its material supply, the means of organizing material supply (equipment, means of transportation delivery), the territory, conditions for conducting combat actions and several other factors.

Studying the experience of the material supply of the Russian Federation in combat actions, taking into account the above factors, is the most correct way to achieve the goal.

Material support of the Russian Federation the experience of the troops is very important for the material support of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Some scientific factors can be cited as examples to justify their importance. For example, where the existing basic techniques in our material supply units are currently produced, the armament of the composition of the units, the structure of the organizational state indicates the need to assess which state is close to the material supply units. Taking into account such a number of factors,



the study of the experience of material supply of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in armed majors is the main way in improving this area.

The first military campaigns of the Federal troops of the Russian Federation from 1994 to 1996 and the second from 1999 to 2001 carried out extensive operations in the North Caucasus region. At the initial stage of its operations, the main parts and institutions of the operational (district) front rear supply of the North Caucasus military district were not able to fully participate in its service process for certain reasons (Road, command, bridge). To participate in the actions in the front, the district troops were joined not only by the North Caucasian military district, but also by various equipped, armed and various combat units, military units and units from other districts and fleets. [1]

The biggest of the problems were delays in the preparation of these troops for hostilities and the time of their transportation to the combat zone.

The lack of loading and unloading capacity of individual railway stations (concrete, Prudboy, Kizlyar) on the Volgograd-Mozdok line did not allow the junction and sections to reach the indicated area in time. They arrived in the indicated areas with a delay of 1-2 days, which significantly reduced the time of preparation of the front rear supply. Analysis of the implementation of mass military transport shows that insufficient attention was paid to teaching the transport of troops, the timing of loading echelons as a result of the lack of practical skills in the placement and fastening of military equipment on railway cars



From 34 hours to 38 hours. In fact, this time indicator is by Norm 3-6 hours were marked as [1].

Echelons ' drop Times also showed that they did not correspond to normal times. The same can be said about the lowering of the Echelon. The time indicator is 3-6 hours by the norm, but in practice military echelons are lowered to 19 - 30 hours[1].

In order to avoid such a problem during hostilities, the first priority is to revise the normative Times of loading and unloading troops, to increase the readiness of troops in this regard, that is, to load techniques at least twice a year in the summer and winter seasons and in terms of unloading, it is necessary to organize and conduct visual activities. Loading and unloading on railways in military units (training field areas and centers) indicates the need to equip the training area and systematically organize practical training.

Analysis of the supply and consumption of material resources of the Federal troops of the Russian Federation the Union of the supply of the front rear and revealed a number of shortcomings in the transportation capabilities and organization of its parts. Especially during the first chechen campaign, the expenditure of material means (without mentioning the preservation of fixed reserves) exceeded the established norm (Figure 1), and in the second chechen campaign, the ratio of these indicators changed (Figure 2). The Department of material supply of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was forced to attract transports from other counties to transport material vehicles [3].





During the hostilities, part of the reserves were kept on the ground, especially during the final stage of the operation, the supply of reserves was made difficult due to the displacement and constant movements of enemy troops. The solution to this problem was solved by separating the auxiliary means from the reserve of the head of the front-rear supply of the district troop range to kilish, which, if necessary, harmed the interests of providing other units and military kism.

The analysis of the supply of bread in the organization of food supply in field conditions of the district troop range shows that the low production capacity, automated level of field bread factories produced in the 1950s, which were in armament, did not meet the modern requirements of the troops (4-5 hours). The KP-125, KP-130 type kitchen priseps, and Pak-200 kitchen cars in combat situations showed that they were roadless in their constructive descriptions (low permeability, load-bearing, reliability) and unsuitable for movement in difficult-to-pass Areas [1].

In the final stages of the opera, it can be seen that during the conduct of Mannerist combat actions, the use of prisepli canteens also led to large delays. When preparing food, atmospheric air, dust soil, (the time of short stops the tents in the state could not spread food points) adversely affected the preparation of food. It also greatly complicated the working conditions of the chefs and in some cases caused food poisoning.

The issue of nutrition for drivers of car columns and crews of military equipment was not completely resolved until the end. Drivers boarded the flight at 7-8 a.m. and traveled between 7 and 9 hours (sometimes even more), staying all day without hot food. The crews of military equipment were forced to walk with dry food for 3-7 days, when there were no small-sized food heating devices for heating food. Similar problems arose when preparing hot food from

canned and concentrated foods. From this, the units of the rear-of-the-front troops did not have modern technical means for storing perishable products and bread [3].

The experience of the food supply of hostilities in the North Caucasus region shows that in the conditions of war, it is necessary to switch to the provision of semi-ripe individual and group Food, which will be quickly ready, given that the implementation of food in the traditional way (cooking hot food in the kitchen in fresh and canned food) poses difficulties.

Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan in units of material supply as part of the Brigade, battalion tactical groups in the permanent shaylik

it can be concluded that it is time to include its techniques intended for storing food in summer and winter in field conditions. For example, it is necessary to militarize the production of modern self-made refrigerated cars, introduce them into the States or equip them in a new way with existing techniques.

When determining the expenditure of material resources allocated for conducting local operas, their expenditure in Real action may differ significantly from the average daily expenditure and planned for their expenditure. For example, during the period of combat operations, the average daily fuel consumption was as follows:

filling 0.4-0.45 for automotive gasoline (AB), filling 0.5-0.55 for diesel fuel (dyo), but the norm of daily refueling in the troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was filling AB – 0.22 and dyo - 0.27, based on the requirement of the leadership documents. Today in our troops these indicators are marked as AB – 0,3 and dyo – 0,5 filling (Figure 3). It can be seen from this that in the planning of the provision of combat operas, it is necessary not only to judge the requirements of the executive documents, but also to judge the factors of the current influence. The increase in AB and dyo consumption depends not only on difficult road conditions, but also on the fact that combat vehicles have not been used for many years, first of all, the malfunction of heating systems, the inability of cars to re-fire after stopping (the state of accumulator batteries not at a satisfactory level). [1].

3-picture. Dzhangovar shurlarga enilgining prices

Uaytkazilgan operation as a result of shuni kursatmokdaki, the success of erishish as a zhangchilarni retired front ORT supply, as well as improving morale-an important provision of both practices of oshirish.

Ethical - spiritual provision - bu-ban-Ban-KK bashkaruv organlar, kohmondlar (komandirlar, bashliklar), shtablar, arboviy and mafuraviy ishlar organlari, Bashkaruv organlari and official personalization each kandai vasildar vasiliard, officials igilari bajariygan-Yugan-the state of morality and morality. in this article we will talk about how to improve the quality of manufacturing, how to do to improve the quality and workmanship. is a set of coordinated actions on. [5].

Moral-spiritual provision is closely connected with other types of operational (combat), front-back and technical support of military actions.

Moral-mental state is the moral and mental readiness of the personal composition, formed under the influence of the environmental factor and conditions, commanders (commanders, Chiefs), organs of educational and ideological affairs, demonstrating mercenary actions in complex conditions of the situation in order to successfully perform combat tasks during



military (special) actions with minimal psychogenic casualties, that is, the sum of its mental abilities. [5].

A number of features were also manifested in regard to the moral and spiritual supply of the opera conducted by the Federal troops of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus. In order to form and maintain a stable moral and mental state in the personal composition during the operation, the following activities were carried out in order to provide quick information. Additional copies of the " Krasnaya Zvezda "newspaper were printed at the rate of 2,000 copies, and the " Russian " newspaper was printed at the rate of 6,000 copies, creating sections for their rapid delivery. In addition, two newsletters of 600 copies were issued each, and 10 types of leaflets were prepared for the local people and military personnel participating in the opera, each of which was issued for circulation of 500 copies.



Employees of the medical (Main Directorate of educational affairs) of the Russian armed forces, in cooperation with representatives of the press service and Information Department of the president of the Russian Federation, prepared and broadcast 42 information programs with



a total duration of 480 minutes, two special issues of the program "service to Russia", each lasting 1 hour. [3].

From experiments in organizing the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the supply of the front rear to the territory of the conflict in Chechnya, it can be concluded that they should be taken into account by separately analyzing some aspects of the experience of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the time of planning and organizing the relocation of their troops. Front rear supply units and units arrived in the designated area earlier than the combat units. Representatives of the front rear supply bodies were sent much earlier, they were charged with organizing, questions of putting troops on all types of supply, location in the territory and solving other tasks.

The fact that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were transferred to the outsourcing system, divided into multiple branches, in the supply of the front rear, requires more costs, but ensures that military personnel in the troops are trained only with combat training.

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